5: Blanco Izaga G-4,5 (1914-1945) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3
Aith Waryaghar

695 [784] It was, and is, universally believed that anyone who perjured himself at oath would suffer dire consequence; either he, or some member of his family, or his livestock, would be struck dead or blind or dumb by God shortly thereafter, or, if not, that some other almost equally awesome calamity would befall him; and informants cited numerous examples. And: if either the accused or any of his cojurors failed to turn up at the mosque to take oath at the time stipulated (without a valid excuse for not doing so), it was the accused who had to pay the fine for whatever damages he had caused the plaintiff, as his non-[184] appearance was sufficient proof of his guilt. The same was true if [191] one or more of his prospective cojurors refused to swear with him; unlike in the Central Atlas, he could not obtain substitute cojurors, through sacrifice--the Rifian oath system was simpler and more inflexible. And if, of course, the plaintiff failed to show up, there was no oath at all. The accused or any of his cojurors could, however, be legitimately excused (as could the plaintiff) in the event that they had been unavoidably detained or prevented from appearing through illness, etc., in which case the oath was postponed until the following Friday or until such time as the individual in question was well enough to swear.

000 [114] 39--Here Blanco contradicts a previous assertion he made by saying that in this instance Islam and customary law are at one, and that the former puts the responsibility on the individual (which is true as far as oaths are concerned, but highly questionable in many other respects), while the latter puts it on the group!

[157] [181] 40--Blanco develops, and very amusingly, his ideas regarding the Rifian and his perennial mistrust (shimta walu, WALU CONFIANZA!) of his fellow man and of the world around him in a series of humorous papers (Analisis Espectral del Rifeño, Hospitalidad Rifeña, La Garrota Berberisca and Del Gesto en el Islam), all unpublished, which most unfortunately cannot be fitted into the framework of the present compilation.

[191] [572] [114] 41--This is very true; but only in part, for where the author's notion bogs down is in the simple fact that the European "word of honor" is essentially conceptualized as individual rather than collective. One may, to be sure, speak of a "national word of honor", among Europeans, but again this is personified individually through heads of state, etc. Thus, phenomenologically, the European "word of honor" and the Berber collective oath are two rather different kettle of fish, despite a certain parallelism in their objectives.

[114] 42--Blanco's meaning is not quite clear; but, if we understand him aright, why should the imqqranen have either depreciated the value of collective oaths or themselves be depreciated in turn for having to swear? If a defendant can legitimately get powerful and influential cojurors for himself, so much the better for him; but then again, in the Rif, an amghar, though respected by his own constituents, was considered no less bullet-proof than anyone else by his enemies....When Blanco refers to "those who were in on the secret", he presumably means "cojurors".

villages, thus giving rise to the linkages[18] discussed earlier.

D) Political Organization:

1) The Individual Liff:--The liff is the union of individuals or groups of individuals in ways and means and towards ends to be discussed below....When one sees, over a period of time, two Rifians going together to markets, weddings and saints' tombs, as well as to each other's houses, and engaging in long and earnest conversations while sitting under a fig tree, etc., it is said that they, A and B, are not only imddukar (sing. amddukar), or friends, but that they are in liff; or rather, that A is in B's liff, if the latter has greater prestige.

The tie which unites these two individuals is not the same as one which might bind two Europeans together, for the bond between the latter may be that of affinity of ideas and interests, and in any case, both persons concerned have at the same time many other independent friendships. The European is both indefinite and free, but a Rifian cannot exist by himself. The European associate only shares a part of his freedom; a Rifian in analogous circumstances would enslave it all. A European can change his friendships, but a Rifian cannot abandon his liff mate if the latter is attacked. For, lacking any higher organization, would any warlike society, like that of the Rif, admit a disloyal person, a coward, a deserter or turncoat? And what, in a society so given to feuding, would an isolated or neutral individual be able to do?[19]....I suspect, indeed, that the celebrated hospitality of the Rifians and their faithfulness to the given word are not so much personality traits as simply results of their system of alliances[20].

671 628 613 728 Things went well, while the violators of the past were humble figures among the allied groups, incapacitated by their slight strength and the fact that they had few friends to abuse the pact by opposing themselves to other groups concerned; but when the equilibrium was upset or broken by the hatreds of the more distinguished lineage members, dragging their powerful lineages into the fray, the pact was wrecked and peace disappeared anew.

671 628 728 Observe in note 1 the guarantee of peace. In note 2, the formality of the agreement obtained. In note 3, the punishment. In note 4, the violation of the agreement. In note 5, the executive organ, the mass of the population. In note 6, the procedure. In note 7, the reason for the punishment, because it is a voluntary law. In notes 8 and 9, the fulfillment. In notes 10 and 11, the notables, the really significant personages, the Aitharbi'in. In notes 12 and and 13, with economic details, the democratic sensation of defective practice. In note 14, the Rifian illusion.

671 628 152 Notes 3 and 4 seem to show that Rifian custom is not designed to punish the loyal combatant, who, in an inflamed dispute, comes impulsively to make use of arms, incapable of dominating his instincts and always quick to defend his rights, but also to avoid treachery, cunning and hatred, or rather, vengeance, reprisal, from which the Rifians did not know how to free themselves, and which used up men and families. This is a notion which renders honors to manhood and stigmatizes the coward.

[577] [828]

554 671 In notes 2, 10 and 11 it may be seen who the Rifians of significance are and that only these men, and not the ordinary tribesmen, are the executives and legislators. This proves what has been said

614 648 in the tribal political organization and entangle it badly, a tribe which up to now appears to be the least clear or tangible of all those studied and known so far.[105]

687 [671] [829] As European states do, this document imposes a public duty upon the natives of the territory, for they must defend their tribal lands with their weapons in their hands; and it even includes punishment for anyone who shrinks from staying in the danger zone. While, [682] however, among Europeans such a punishment is moderate, we see that [443] among Rifians, by the importance of the fine (2000 duros) the penalty is as high as that for murder (i.e. in the market), for this amount is equal to that stipulated as ddiyith[106] in two qanuns already examined, that of Aith 'Abdallah and that of Aith 'Adhiya.

Thus, then, an offense against patriotism constitutes a crime in itself, and it is sanctioned analogously upon the coward and deserter as homicide is upon the murderer.

577 524 671 This may explain the virtues, such as courage and hospitality which we have so frequently seen attributed to the Rifians; for it was precisely their clear-cut laws and rude (i.e. rough and ready) custom which urged them on, stimulated them (see the qanun of the jma'th of Thamasind for hospitality) and which perforce they practiced.[107]

67 70 [702] 11. A QANUN OF HARKA--AITH WARYAGHAR:

It is obligatory for all the qa'ids and members of a harka that each one of them must present himself in fixed turns, which each one must take without losing a day. Whoever does not obey this order, except in the following cases, such as illness[108], and nobody may go on leave during his turn without authorization from the kabir al-mahalla.[109]

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Any fisherman with dynamite is the owner of the fish and site of the explosion while he remains there. Fishermen with lines may not enter the radius of action of dynamite fishermen.

In fishing with explosives, the man who first sees the fish and stays to wait for them is entitled to remain in the spot observed. Nobody who has just arrived can shoot. For this reason, fishermen with explosives keep out of each others' way.

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G) Recovery:

Any object without a known owner which is abandoned or tossed up on the beach by the sea is the property of whoever finds it.

Any object floating in the sea is the property of whoever picks it up; and if there are several people who put their hands on it in order to hoist it onto the boat or drag it onto the beach, it, or the proceeds from it, are divided equally among all who have worked, in the last instance, among the crew and the boat owners; but a man who sees it from the sea, for example, has no right to it, as he has not helped to get it on board or ashore. Work, and not vision, is rewarded.

(517)

H) Arbiters

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Arbiters are men who are skilled in maritime questions and excellent mediators whose reputation, in addition to the reduced coastal limits of their tribe(s), is known and commented upon in all the villages of the neighboring tribes; and to them the inhabitants of these villages go voluntarily in order to submit their differences of opinion when these deal with matters relating to the sea.

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Those who had most fame in the Rifian coast were, long ago, the Ghmara, to whose ports of Taghza and Tigisas it was not uncommon

000 223 224 629 578 671 [191] at once, it is divided among them (Aith 'Ammarth). In the Sanhaja Srir, the mulu' sometimes resolves the question of ownership by hefting the sticks of those who are disputing and giving it to the man whose stick weighs most.

3) Animals or birds disputed about without sufficient proof of ownership are taken away from both parties and handed over to the mulu' (Ibuqquyen).

671 223 224 411 4) An animal or bird hit both by a shot and by a stick belongs to the man with the stick if it falls less than twenty steps from where the latter threw, and to the man with the gun if the distance is over twenty steps (Aith 'Ammarth).

671 223 5) A bird hit by a shot and caught by another hunter in whose vicinity it falls belongs, if it falls down dead, to the man who fired the shot, and to the other man if it is only wounded and if he pursues it and finishes it off. If there are no witnesses, whoever gets it [572] [695] must say if it fell down alive or not, and an oath to this effect can be demanded of him (Sanhaja Srir).

671 223 224 6) Any bird or animal which has fallen outside the range of vision of a hunter belongs to whoever finds it if he is going hunting also; and if he is not, it belongs to whoever wounded it (in the same way that in the method of acquiring property by vivification, this case shows a recompense for physical effort, denying rights of recovery to a goatherd or a traveler whom luck might favor instead of the hunter)

[201] 7) A bird or animal sitting in a thicket or in its den belongs to whoever discovers it; and the latter must make his discovery known by raising his stick and crying out "1-'adaw", these both being signs of recovery (Ibuqquyen and Aith Waryaghar).

556 472 183 It is possible, of course, for a single individual to incorporate both a spirit of entrepreneurship and of tradition in his activities. However, such a combination is difficult because the principle of profit is basically antagonistic to the principle of self-effacement and communal solidarity. The entrepreneur stands in a different relationship to the community than most of its other members. His pursuit of profit is an individualistic goal and there is a proverb among the Kabylia Berbers which with equal justice can be applied to the Rif, ". . . only the devil [Chit'an] says 'I' . . ." (Bourdieu 1965: 210). In such a society, individual initiative in the realm of capital gain or income-producing investment may be financially remunerative but of negative value in terms of social interrelations. 556 472 183 Those men who are motivated by profit often find the atmosphere of the rural community uncongenial and they migrate to Alhucemas or Targuist. 521 369 While Riffians who live in the rural areas may be covetous of some of the advantages which accrue to 186 the urban dweller such as electricity and running water, they are contemptuous of the faster pace, the crowded conditions, the separation from the soil, and the dishonesty, with which they associate the city businessman.

556 472 521 577 There is, I think, a quite clear cleavage between the ideology which guides the Riffian in his economic action and that which guides the entrepreneur. The difference is manifested in all sorts of practical arrangements such as credit, contract, investment, and so forth. It is due to the fact that

556 the profit incentive is entirely secondary to the social incen-
472 tive. In order to understand these differences more clearly,
591 let us examine the process by which an investment is made by
597 both the tribal peasant and the entrepreneur.

556 In order to make an investment some sort of capital must
454 be available, either through savings or acquired by credit. The
231 most common form of savings among the fellah is in the form of
471 livestock. Livestock in this society, however, is encumbered with certain values that savings in an industrial society do not generally possess. For one thing, livestock is heavily committed to meet ceremonial expenses. It is also a highly visible form of savings and consequently has a symbolic value in terms of prestige. By assigning such resources to capital development the fellah weakens his traditional position in the
556 community. Another form of savings is jewelry, which can be
30 regarded as cash storage. While jewelry has this potential in
454 the Rif, it is rather difficult to translate into a function.
[422] Jewelry is a woman's possession passed on from mother to daughter. Although many men are wont to utilize their wives' jewelry for increasing cash reserves, they cannot readily do so. Many of the women hoard their jewelry in their mothers' houses in order to assure that it stays in their possession. This form of wealth is regarded as an inviolable possession of the female and as such has definite cultural barriers to its being used as savings.

452 Another form of financing expenses for investment is through obtaining credit. Credit in the Rif, however, is based